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1. ABSTRACT 
 
This poster examines the use and misuse of science information in 
the federal government. Scientific information is a vital 
component of policy making in the U.S. today. Stine notes that 
science research is “intricately linked to societal needs and the 
nation‟s economy in areas such as transportation, communication, 
agriculture, education, environment, health, defense, and jobs” [7, 
p. i]. In the past, the relationship between science and policy was 
seen as a linear process: science conducted research, collected 
data, and presented its findings to federal agencies, which then use 
that evidence to determine the best policy action [2, 5].  
 
However, the reality of science policy is far more complex; while 
science is a valuable source of information, it is also problematic, 
since scientific data may conflict with political, moral, and 
economic values [5, 6, 7]. For example, if endangered fish reside 
in a lake, politicians may face choices between preserving the 
ecosystem, irrigating nearby farms, and allowing recreational use 
of the lake. Each choice has economic, environmental, and 
political ramifications. Doremus explains that “esthetic, 
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, or scientific” 
values can all be considered relevant foundations for agency 
decisions [3, p. 1136]. Because of this complexity, “the political 
community and the scientific community… collaborate at the 
boundary of politics and science over the integrity and 
productivity of research” [5, p. 143]. In this conceptualization, 
“government cannot make good policy decisions unless the 
decision makers have access to, and appropriately use, the best 
available understanding of the facts” [4, p. 1639].  
 
Federal agencies, like individuals, have information behaviors—
they create, access, review, share, evaluate, and act upon 
information in order to formulate and assess public policy.  
Agencies could accept scientific conclusions and use them as the 
basis of policy formation. Agencies could accept the science, yet 
determine that it is not the best or sole basis of effective policy. Of 
course, agencies could reject or partially reject the science, thus 
creating more opportunities to basis policy on other 
considerations. Typical agency behavior with respect to science 
falls across a spectrum, with science being neither unreservedly 
endorsed nor discarded. While “a scientist views science as a way 
of learning, a policy maker…may see science as the justification 
for a decision, a requirement of the law, a tool or impediment, or 
something that opposes or supports their viewpoint” [1, p. 1005]. 
Furthermore, agency information behavior with respect to science 
does not exist in isolation. There is recurring interaction between 
science and policy. For instance, scientists who study the toxic 
effects of chemicals and report their conclusions to the 
Environmental Protection Agency, to guide agency behavior, will 
likely continue studying the same chemicals and providing 
additional information to further influence policy. How the EPA 
behaves with respect to the scientific information may shape 
future research, communication efforts, or the information 
behaviors of the scientists themselves.  
 
Principal-agent theory is frequently used to explain how science 
and policy interact. Under this approach, federal agencies, as 
principals, contract with science to provide needed information. 
Science then acts as an agent, supplying data and conclusions in 
exchange for funding, prestige, and other rewards [5, 6]. 
Principal-agent theory captures a significant portion of the 
interaction between science and policy, but does not reflect the 
entire relationship. Specifically, principal-agent theory has little to 
say about how agencies use science—the information behaviors in 
which they engage—or how these information behaviors affect 
subsequent interaction with scientists. The theory currently does 
not address the problem of under-utilized or under-appreciated 
agents. If the agents perceive their work is not incorporated into 
policy, perhaps they will refuse to do further work, will begin 
doing shoddy work, or will attempt to subtly integrate policy 
advice into their work. Since these information behaviors are, in 
fact, a crucial part of formulating policy, they ought not be 
overlooked.  
 
The nature of the recurring interactions, and how they are affected 
by agencies‟ information behavior, has not been explicitly 
examined in the previous literature. This poster illuminates these 
aspects of the relationships between science and policy. Specific 
examples of agencies using and misusing scientific information 
will be drawn from the literature to illustrate the complex 
interactions. The full, cyclical relationship between science and 
policy will be portrayed, demonstrating how agencies‟ 
information behaviors may affect subsequent research and 
communication behaviors. This will necessarily entail a 
refinement of principal-agent theory as it has been applied to 
science policy.  
 
This research will be a valuable contribution in several ways. It 
brings science policy—how scientific information is used or 
misused—to the explicit attention of iSchools and their cognate 
fields of study. As we create technological tools and engage in 
policy-relevant research, we need to pay attention to how our data 
and conclusions may or may not be utilized. In addition, science 
policy can benefit from the theoretical and conceptual rigor of the 
trans-disciplinary research of the iSchools. Finally, the research 
will also test and strengthen the use of principal-agent theory as it 
applies to science policy. Overall, this theory has great utility, but 
can be refined to address more of the interaction between science 
and policy.  
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